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Abstract: This paper provides an attempt to conceive of music in terms of a sounding 
environment. Starting from a definition of music as a collection of vibrational events,  
it introduces the distinction between discrete-symbolic representations as against  
analog-continuous representations of the sounds. The former makes it possible to conceive 
of music in terms of a Humboldt system, the latter in terms of an experiential approach. 
Both approaches, further, are not opposed to each other, but are complementary to some 
extent. There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between the bottom-up approach to 
auditory processing of environmental sounds and music, which is continuous and proceeding 
in real time, as against the top-down approach, which is proceeding at a level of mental 
representation by applying discrete symbolic labels to vibrational events. The distinction is 
discussed against the background of phylogenetic and ontogenetic claims, with a major 
focus on the innate auditory capabilities of the fetus and neonate and the gradual evolution 
from mere sensory perception of sound to sense-making and musical meaning. The latter, 
finally, is elaborated on the basis of the operational concepts of affordance and functional 
tone, thus bringing together some older contributions from ecology and biosemiotics. 
Keywords: music as environment; sonic universe; Humboldt system; internal semantics; 
fetal auditory development; ecology; affordance; biosemiotics 
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1. Introduction 
Can we conceive of music as a sounding environment? And how does a listener cope with this 
environment? Can we rely on existing definitions of music and dealing with music, or is there need of 
broadening of the conceptual framework to describe the listening behavior that is common across 
human listeners? This contribution tries to give an answer to these questions by introducing an 
ethological framework that describes the listening process from a biological point of view, relying 
heavily on the concept of coping with the sounds. It stresses the need of clear definitions of general 
concepts, such as environment, sounding environment and sonic universe and provides an operational 
framework for the description of the process of coping with the sounds by relying on the older insights 
of ecology and biosemiotics. 
The term sonic or sounding environment, first, has many definitions, depending upon the field of 
study. It can range from the environment of the embryo, the intimate environment of the infant, to the 
home, the concert hall, the city or expanses of wild nature, but researchers in each of these fields are 
all interested in sound. In an attempt to standardize these meanings, attempts have been made to 
provide definitions and criteria for classifying them [1–3] revolving basically around the concept of 
soundscape, which suggests exploring all the sounds in the environment in its complexity, ambivalence, 
meaning and context. The soundscape concept, as introduced by Schafer [4], was originally thought as 
an evaluation of noise and its effects on the quality of life but has evolved later to incorporate both the 
conditions and purposes of its production and reception. Having been the subject of much research and  
applications [3,5,6] it has furthered a kind of paradigm shift in the evaluation of environmental sound 
from “measurement by instruments” to “measurement by human persons” [1]. The concept of 
soundscape, in fact, explicitly includes a subjective component, namely the way in which the 
environment is perceived and understood by an individual or by a community [7] with a corresponding 
shift towards a more cognitive approach to environmental sounds as meaningful events that affect 
people [8–10]. This is exemplified in the considerations of a Working Group (ISO/TC 43.SC1) that 
was established to begin consideration of a standardized method for assessment of soundscape quality 
outdoors, incorporating not only the presence or absence of annoying sounds, but also the positive 
aspects of sound environments as perceived by people as well. There is, in fact, a wealth of different 
terms that are used to describe the soundscape, such as the acoustic environment, the sonic 
environment, the sound environment, the environment of sound, aural space, the natural acoustic 
environment and environmental sounds, sound ambient environments, ambient conditions, quiet areas, 
areas of high acoustic quality, city soundscape, the total ambient acoustic environment, the total 
soundscape, the acoustic soundscape and many others. A completely adequate and appropriate term 
that was suggested for the entity on which soundscape studies focus was the “acoustic environment as 
perceived or experienced and/or understood by people in context” [11]. 
Much early research has been directed to the study of noise and noisy environments with a special 
focus on city noise [6,12,13], but also here there has been a shift from the study of mere noisy spaces 
to a conception of the soundscape as resource, addressing not only noise avoidance, but rather sound  
quality of urban environments. Soundscape analysis, in this view, places sound in context with the 
listeners’ sensational reality depending on their socio-cultural background and the psychological 
dimension of the acoustical setting and with as major question “What does this feature of the 
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environment mean to me?” [2,14]. It calls forth an affordance-driven approach to the study of sonic 
environment (see below), which means that soundscape analysis should combine the physical 
measurement of sound with a scientific investigation and evaluation of the community and individual 
perception of sound in terms of what it affords to the listener, thus relating human hearing and objective 
measurement. Acoustic environments, therefore, cannot be measured merely in terms of acoustic 
parameters, such as energy equivalent sound pressure levels (Leq) in A-weighted decibels (dB(A)).  
What is needed, on the contrary, is a shift to more qualitative evaluations of sound quality with 
analysis techniques, which aim at deriving relevant inferences about how people process and 
conceptualize sensory experiences in an attempt to bridge the gap between individual sensory 
experiences and sociological representations of soundscapes [9]. 
Applying this to the realm of music calls forth a redefinition of its scope. Music, in fact, is a 
vibratory phenomenon that impinges upon the senses. The issue can be raised, therefore, whether we 
should adhere to a “humano-centric” web of culture that conceives music as a cultural artifact with 
little room for the natural [15] or as something that calls forth biological reactions to the sounds. The 
question brings together biology, humanities and music and is illustrative of the biology/culture and 
nature/nurture dichotomies, which have colored musical discussions for decades [16]. The biological 
position argues for wired-in mechanisms of reactivity to music as sound; the cultural position argues 
for responses that are the outcome of immersion in a culture. The antithesis, which was very strong at 
first, however, has begun to break down recently with developments in evolutionary theory and 
ethological research, which state that cultures may vary, but that the human capacity for culture 
appears to be a human universal [17,18]. Both culture and music are born out of man’s animal 
characteristics, which are rooted in the biology of perception and cognition—this is the gene-culture 
coevolutionary theory [19]—and this may be universal to a great extent [18,20–22]. It calls forth the 
issue of musical universals [23,24], which can be studied from the point of view of music-structural 
characteristics as well as from the dispositional machinery to deal with music. Arom’s definition of 
anthropomusicology, e.g., is typical of the first approach. In an attempt to provide a general description 
of music, he provides a list of (quasi-)universal human musical properties that are manifested in the 
whole body of known music of the world and which embrace at least four criteria: intentionality or an 
act of intentional construction; a formal process which detaches the music from the sound 
environment; a set of contrastive pitches, and, if the music involves more than one individual, modes 
of coordination between them [25]. It is possible, however, to broaden this list by relying not merely 
on music as a human-made phenomenon but also on more general mechanisms of coping with the 
sounding world. 
2. The Acoustic Environment and the Sonic Universe 
Music, in its broadest definition, is a subset of the sonic universe, which can be considered as the 
collection of sounding elements that represent the totality of sounds as a virtual infinity of possible 
combinations of individual vibrational events [26]. Sound, as a physical phenomenon, is caused by 
vibration, but not all vibrational events can be categorized as music and not all vibrations even make 
sound. We should distinguish, further, between distinct acoustic categories, such as noise and music, 
dependent upon the specific vibrational contents of the sounds. Periodic and complex vibrations, such 
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as the sounds of musical instruments and the human voice, e.g., produce harmonics—the characteristic 
vibrational patterns that occur simultaneously with a fundamental tone and that are responsible for the 
richness of the sound—which are perceived mostly as pleasant and preferred auditory stimuli; noise, 
on the contrary, shows vibrations that result in irregular frequencies, with inconsistencies of tension, 
stress and configuration, and which mostly generate fatigue, stress, hyperalerting responses and startle 
reflexes in listeners [27,28]. This common distinction, however, can be questioned to some extent. 
Soundscape research, e.g., has provided many examples of sounds, which fit the definition of noise and 
yet were described as pleasant with the sound of flowing water as a typical example [29,30]. There is, 
further, also a subjective element that is related to the distinction between noise and music. The music 
of Stravinsky, Bartók, Stockhausen and others was perceived by some as noise, at least in the beginning, 
and Stravinsky’s “Le Sacre du Printemps” caused a near riot at the Paris Opera at its first performance. 
There are, in fact, significant personal, cultural and historical differences in this regard. It makes more 
sense, therefore, to start from another distinction, namely the difference between the use and meaning 
of the terms noise and sound in French and English [31]. The French word “bruit” (noise), e.g., was 
primarily used to refer to sources producing noise whereas “son” (sound) was used to describe acoustic 
phenomena as physical abstractions from the sources. They account for an important linguistic distinction 
to describe acoustic categories as related to different cognitive representations of the sounds [9]. 
Continuing this line of thought, the question can be raised, which elements are eligible for inclusion 
in the musical subuniverse. Should we conceive of natural or man-made sounds? The whole history of 
musical instrument building, e.g., has been one prolonged search for applying craftsmanship to raw 
materials in order to obtain musical sounds. Composers, however, are free also to incorporate  
non-musical sounds in their works, and to make something musical out of non-musical materials.  
As such, they can musicalize the sonic environment by giving semantic weight to sounding elements, 
which were otherwise neutral with respect to musical meaning. This is a process of semiotization of the 
sonic world, which is not limited to composers but which can be generalized to music listeners in 
general. Much depends, however, on the way these listeners deal with some of their environmental 
sounds. Is it enough to merely pick up musical sounds with a characteristic acoustic structure—suggesting 
that perception depends entirely upon information in the stimulus array [32,33]—or should we assume 
some cognitive processing and selective evaluation by the listener as well? The question is important 
as it cuts across the objective/subjective dichotomy. Musical sounds, in fact, point to both ways: they 
are part of an existing acoustic structure that is objectively there, but the pickup of sounds depends on 
acts of focal attention which are subjective to some extent. 
2.1. The Concept of Environment 
An environment, according to Lewontin, is all that surrounds. This broad definition by an 
evolutionary biologist simply means that there is no environment without an organism and no 
organism without an environment [34]. Environments of animals and men, moreover, are characterized 
by their most fundamental property, namely that they perceive and act in their environments. 
Perception and action, therefore, are not really separable at all [35,36] and most subjective universes or 
environments of animals and men are meaningful only to the extent that they are constituted within 
specific life activities. As such, they must be distinguished from the environment or the surroundings 
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as these would appear to an indifferent observer without knowledge of the subjective meanings for a 
particular human or an animal. They constitute, so to say, phenomenal worlds or Umwelts, as von 
Uexküll lucidly has coined the term:  
“The best time to set out on such an adventure is on a sunny day. The place, a flower-strewn 
meadow, humming with insects, fluttering with butterflies. Here we may glimpse the 
worlds of the lowly dwellers of the meadow. To do so, we must first blow, in fancy, a soap 
bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions, which 
it alone knows. When we ourselves then step into one of the bubbles, the familiar meadow 
is transformed. Many of its colorful features disappear, others no longer belong together 
but appear in new relationships. A new world comes into being. Through the bubble we see 
the world of the burrowing worm, of the butterfly, or of the field mouse; the world as it 
appears to the animals themselves, not as it appears to us. This we may call the 
phenomenal world or the self-world of the animal.” [37] (p. 5). 
2.2. The Sonic Environment 
Subjective universes cannot be described in merely objective terms. They imply a learning history 
and multiple interactions between an organism and its environment. This holds true, also, for the  
sonic environment of human listeners—considered as organisms—which is different at distinct phases 
of ontogenetic development, such as the intrauterine environment of the fetus, the extrauterine 
environment of the newborn and the natural and artificial sound environment of the developing child 
and adult listener. As such there is a whole history of sequential immersions in new environments: at 
first there is the heartbeat of the mother; other unfamiliar sounds are added very soon—Hicks has 
coined this the uterine symphony [38] (p. 31)—and from the 24th week on, the unborn child is 
immersed continuously in the very noisy environment of the pregnant abdomen and uterus; after birth, 
during the transition from intrauterine to extrauterine life, one of the most stressful changes is the loss 
of rhythm that the fetus has become accustomed to through months of being exposed to maternal 
movements, breathing, and heartbeat [39] and as neonates grow older, finally, they are embedded in 
increasingly challenging and complex sonic environments, which may be natural or artificial ones.  
The latter, especially, have become very pervasive in the last decades, with a sonic soundscape being 
shaped increasingly by traffic noise, industrial sounds and noises of work environment and even 
music. As such, there is a noticeable evolution, which was described by Schafer as a transition from a 
Hi-Fi to Lo-Fi Soundscape. To quote his words:  
“A hi-fi system is one possessing a favourable signal to noise ratio. The hi-fi soundscape is 
one in which discrete sounds can be heard clearly because of the low ambient noise level. 
The country is generally more hi-fi than the city; night more than day; ancient times more 
than modern. In a hi-fi soundscape even the slightest disturbance can communicate 
interesting or vital information. The human ear is alert, like that of an animal. […] In a  
lo-fi soundscape individual acoustic signals are obscured in an overdense population of 
sounds. The pellucid sound—a footstep in the snow, a train whistle in the distance or a 
church bell across the valley—is masked by broad-band noise. Perspective is lost. On a 
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downtown street corner there is no distance; there is only presence. Everything is  
close-miked. There is cross-talk on all the channels, and in order for the most ordinary 
sounds to be heard they have to be monstrously amplified. In the ultimate lo-fi soundscapes 
the signal to noise ratio is 1 to 1 and it is no longer possible to know what, if anything, is to 
be listened to.” [40] (pp. 32–33) 
The lo-fi soundscape, according to Schafer, is the common soundscape of today. His definition of 
the term, however, is problematical to some extent, as it reflects his own intuitions rather than 
empirical and scientific grounding. More recent soundscape research, in fact, has provided more  
fine-grained evidence of the perceptual structure of urban structure and industrial settings [6,9,41], but 
their noisy character is, of course, not easy to deny. But not all sonic environments of today are lo-fi 
soundscapes. There are quiet places and environmental biotopes in the countryside that may be defined 
unambiguously as hi-fi soundscapes. And also in the city, it is possible to locate hi-fi places, both at a 
public and individual scale. The concert hall, e.g., has made concentrated listening possible, and even 
the usage of earphones has provided a newly recovered “private space” that is commonly referred to as 
head space, to use a popular expression referring to the geography of mind [40] (p. 35). The influence 
of auditory social media, such as headphones, cellphones or iPhones, further, should be considered 
here as well. It is difficult at this moment to anticipate their effects on the perception of sonic 
environments as they create a new sonic environment at a micro scale that imposes on the larger sonic 
world of room, home, school, street and even the concert hall. They can even cut listeners off from the 
social and physical environment. Research on these effects, however, has just begun [42]. 
Sonic environments, in sum, are not univocal for all listeners, who can largely choose what to listen 
to and who can even modify their sonic world to some extent. They perceive only what is perceptually 
present, being there for them to be perceived, but involving also perceptual consciousness as a special 
style of access to the sonic world [43]. 
2.3. Music as Sounding Environment 
Music, considered as a phenomenal subuniverse or sonic Umwelt, can be defined as a collection of 
subjective meanings imprinted upon a subset of the sonic world, including all the meaningful aspects 
of the sounding world for a particular listener. Taking this position as starting point means that the 
perceived qualities of the sounding world are not to be considered merely as objective characteristics 
of the sounds themselves, but as attributions that are acquired by the sounds having entered into 
diverse relationships with the listener. Or stated in ecological terms of organism/environment 
interaction: the listener—considered as an organism—fits the world to itself, ascribing functions to the 
objects it encounters and integrating them into a coherent system of its own [35]. The environment, in 
this view, is merely the projection or mapping out of the organism’s internal organization onto the outside 
world [34]. 
Music, further, has the possibility of being structured by the listener with the listening process being 
defined as a temporally extended, exploratory activity that brings together perception, manipulation, 
and appropriation of different sonic affordances offered up by sonic invariants that are present within 
the music. Krueger calls this the world-making power of the music as “a sonic world that affords 
possibilities for creating, organizing, and regulating listeners’ experiences, emotion regulation and 
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social coordination”. Music, in this view, can be considered as a tool that is appropriate to construct 
different forms of self-experience and social relatedness [43] (p. 7). 
This world-making power of musical environments has been studied extensively in neonate studies 
and in music therapeutic contexts, where sonically inviting aural spaces let the infant perceive music as 
something to be attended to and to cope with in an interactional way. Music, as a sounding 
environment, is acoustically unlike any other sound: it is more pleasant, soothing, and interesting than 
noise and uses highly preferred frequencies and harmonics selected through centuries of refinement 
and development of specific musical styles [44]. It can entrain, moreover, the infant to regulate its 
internal bodily states and expressive movements with positive recurrent features of the musical 
environment [44,45] [46] (p. 79). This holds true, of course, for some specific kinds of music if at least 
some sonic invariants are present, such as textural qualities and temporal regularities of sonic patterns, 
melodic as well as rhythmic ones [46] (p. 85). Most of the music that is used in the neonate context, 
therefore, is texturally soothing, constant (no abrupt modulations of volume, tempo, etc.) and relatively 
unchanging (exhibiting a temporally predictable melodic and rhythmic pattern) in order to reduce 
alerting responses by providing confidence [28,44]. Though such music may be sonically interesting 
by using a single singing voice, light rhythmic emphasis, constant rhythm and volume, and melodies in 
the higher vocal ranges, it is mostly perceptually undemanding so as to become an environment that 
the infant can perceptually conquer, as it were, by experientially understanding it and by perceptually 
gearing onto the predictable patterns in the music. As such, it manifests a kind of predictability that 
affords comfort, as well as a kind of mastery over the music, thus procuring security and stability [45]. 
Music as environment, however, is not to be restricted to the safe environment of the neonate.  
As the child grows older, its sonic environment is getting more unpredictable and complex, as both 
nature and culture provide huge bodies of structured sounds that can be raised to the level of music. 
Much depends, however, on the way how children learn to make sense out of the sonic world, relying 
not only on highly evolved genetically based biological mechanisms but also on supra-instinctual 
survival strategies that have developed in society and have been transmitted by culture. The latter, as a 
rule, require consciousness, reasoned deliberation and willpower with response selections that are no 
longer reducible to the functioning of a set of neural circuits in the older structures of the brain. 
3. From Sound to Music: Discretization and Semanticity 
Music and noise are qualitatively distinct, albeit not in a radical way. Sounds can be either noisy or 
musical, dependent on several criteria of psychophysical processing, such as harmonic structure, 
consonance and dissonance calibration [47,48]. Consonance—more specifically tonal consonance—refers 
to the peculiar sensorial experience associated to isolated tone pairs with simple vibration frequency 
ratios; dissonance, on the contrary, refers to inharmonic or complex vibration frequency ratios [49–51]. 
Ordinary listeners, further, can easily distinguish consonant from dissonant pitch combinations, equating 
these notions with a feeling of pleasantness (consonance) or unpleasantness (dissonance) [49,52].  
The actual mechanism underlying these valuations arises from the roughness created at the level of 
the basilar membrane in the inner ear. Due to overlap in vibration patterns, the resolution of pitches of 
different frequencies is compromised, leading to the phenomenon of beating and a corresponding 
perception of roughness. The criterion of consonance, however, does not explain exhaustively the 
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distinction between musical and noisy sounds. There is also the criterion of regularity and periodicity 
with musical sounds resulting from regular, periodic vibrations and noise resulting from non-periodic 
statistically random vibrations [53]. Sounds, in this view, have been considered as noise if their 
originating frequency is non-periodic and therefore of no determinate pitch, thus lacking purity in 
articulation [54]. This may be helpful in distinguishing between musical sound and noise in acoustic 
terms with noise being considered as undifferentiated sound. The acoustic description, however, is not 
the whole story. There is now a whole ontology of noise [55], which goes beyond its description as an 
auditory phenomenon. According to Sangild [56] (pp. 12–13) there are at least three basic definitions 
of noise: a musical acoustics definition relying purely on physics, a communicative definition based on 
distortion or disturbance of a communicative signal, and a definition based in subjectivity. We can in 
fact say that what is noise to one person can be meaningful to another and that what was considered 
unpleasant sound yesterday is not considered this way today. 
As such, there has been a shift in the valuation and use of noise in music as well [57,58]. Starting 
with Luigi Russolo’s “L’Arte dei Rumori” (The Art of Noises) [59], there has been a major development 
in exploring the possibilities of using noise as musical material. Russolo experimented with noise 
machines, other composers, such as Avraamov used the urban sonic environment to compose a 
“Symphony of Sirens” in 1922 that was performed using the sounds and movements of human crowds, 
machine guns, cannons, factory sirens, airplanes, hydroplanes, trains, battleships, and a steam whistle 
across the spaces of Baku in Azerbaija [60]. There is, in fact, a whole history of noise in music, from 
experimental music of the early 20th century, the experiments of John Cage and Erik Satie, the 
emergence through industrial music, punk, free jazz and bands like Throbbing Gristle and the 
Boredoms since the mid 1970s to the Japanese noise music and glitch electronica of today. 
There is, further, a tension between an increased prevalence of anthropomorphic noise in our daily 
environments and what is commonly considered as natural sounds. In contrast to human-made noise 
that was mostly absent during much of evolution, natural sounds can be defined as environmental 
sounds that are not generated by human-made machines. They include sounds of footsteps, wind, fire 
and rain, animal vocalizations, including human speech and other sounds generated for communication 
by animals (e.g., stridulation in crickets, buttress drumming by chimpanzees) and instrumental music 
by humans [61]. Animal vocalizations, especially, are dominated mostly by sustained harmonic 
sounds, in contrast to environmental sounds, which are dominated mainly by transient sounds. Speech 
sounds, on the other hand, are characterized by rapid variations in spectral distribution and temporal 
pattern with a change in the harmonic spectrum with distinct maxima (formants) in voiced sounds to 
filtered noise in fricative sounds [62]. 
Most behaviorally important sounds—animal and human vocalizations in particular, but also 
musical sounds—have as prominent feature their harmonic spectra [63,64] with central neural 
networks of the listener being preferentially attuned to consonant intervals because of their prevalence 
or biological significance in the environment [65–67]. All sounds, in fact, which are characterized by 
aspects of harmonicity and regularity, can easily be set apart from the acoustic background as a whole. 
As such, they involve an aspect of self-similarity in the sense that they can be recognized as  
such—sounds as sounds—which makes them apt for processes of differentiation, discrimination and 
identification [68]. 
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3.1. Music as a Humboldt System 
Musical sounds—in the above definition as natural and differentiated sounds—mostly are harmonic 
sounds. They are easily detectable and have combinatorial possibilities, both in a simultaneous and 
successive way. Music, in this view, achieves pattern richness on the basis of combinations of small 
sets of discrete elements—discrete durations in the temporal domain and sets of discrete pitches in the 
frequency domain—which yield resulting patterns that are unique, identifiable and recombinable.  
As such, it is possible to conceive of music as a Humboldt system, i.e., a system that makes infinite use 
of finite media [69] and which is based upon the combination of discrete elements, as illustrated by the 
particulate principle of self-diversifying systems [70]. This principle holds that structures, which have 
an infinite range of possibilities, are based on particles, which can be combined. Several independent 
natural systems, such as chemical interactions, biological inheritance and human language, appear to 
exhibit change by a process of variation and selection of dynamically stable, particulate units. 
The setting apart of specific sounds from the acoustic background is a first step in the structuring of 
the environmental sounding flux. It calls forth a process of discretization of the sonic universe, as is 
obvious in the domains of language and music where phonemes and musical sounds can be used in a 
combinatorial way. It should be borne in mind, however, that originally all sounds are indissolubly tied 
to the mechanisms, which produced them so as to become uncounterfeitable and unique. When not 
recorded by means of technological devices, each sound occurs at one time and in one place only. 
Even when they may bear resemblances to one another, such as the phonemes of language or the 
pitched sounds of musical instruments, they are not identical in a strict sense [40] (p. 34). 
There is, further, a distinction to be drawn between combinatorial and creative emergence, the 
former referring to the novelty that results from fresh combinations of pre-existing elements [69,71], 
and the latter to “de novo” creations of new kinds of elements [72]. The distinction, however, is 
gradual rather than qualitative. Creativity in music is combinatorial but it is creative only to the extent 
that the elements and their combinations yield a product that can be perceived as something new. Most 
music, moreover, just as language, starts from a set of pitches or pitch combinations, durations, tone 
colors, etc., but it is possible to go beyond the constraints of a limited set of pre-existing elements. 
Music, in fact, can incorporate all kinds of sounds—artificial and natural—in its texture, and there are 
so many idiosyncrasies and subjectivities in both the production and reception of music that the mere 
claim of a limited set of basic elements in music seems to be problematic. Yet, there are some 
universal musical properties, which are reducible to psychophysical commonalities between disparate 
tonal systems, and to the major role of relatively unchanging biological processes of aural perception 
in discovering patterns of sound. 
As such, it is possible to conceive of basic sonic constituents, which are recognizable as such.  
There is a distinction, however, between the acoustic level of these constituents and their meaning, as 
exemplified most typically by the distinction between the phonetic and phonological level of 
description in linguistics. Phonetics, as a part of the study of speech, is a discipline that investigates 
how speech sounds are produced and perceived. It includes the study of the vocal tract and its 
neuromuscular machinery as well as the hearing apparatus and its underlying neurological structures.  
It can be considered the hardware that implements the control signals that originate from the 
phonological component. Phonology, on the other hand, is related to the logical and functional 
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structure and behavior of speech sounds. It concerns the stored contents of the lexicon and the 
knowledge about their mutual relationships rather than the operations needed for their reception and 
production. Both levels, however, involve each other, as the phonological units and processes are 
shaped to some extent by the physical and physiological structure of the speech mechanism [73]. This is 
obvious from the domain of descriptive or taxonomic phonetics, which consists of a set of more or less 
objective anatomical-physiological descriptors of speech sounds—such as neuromuscular, anatomical, 
aerodynamic, acoustic, and auditory principles of speech sound production—and which could be 
pursued for giving answers to some phonological questions. 
3.2. Internal Semantics and the Computational Approach 
The phonetic/phonological distinction holds true for the basic constituents of speech. There is, 
however, a major distinction between music and language. Being combinatorial systems with discrete 
elements that can be differentiated from each other, they both rely on basic constituents that are 
reducible to discrete slices of temporal unfolding—the phonemes and morphemes of language and the 
individual sounds of music—and combinations of them, which may function as basic building blocks. 
The building blocks of language can be reduced to a finite set of elements—the lexicon—and a 
number of rules for combining them in well-formed ways. This lexicon, together with the grammatical 
rules, constitutes a finite system, which is characterized by external semantics, which means that the 
elements refer to something outside of the written or spoken text. This is not the case, however, for 
music, which can be considered as relying on a self-referential or internal semantics. Musical 
sounds—and combinations of them—do not refer to something outside of the music. Music, therefore, 
is self-reflective in referring only to itself, thus emancipating the sounds from any external and 
denotative meaning. 
This self-reflective way of thinking about music has found its strongest expression in the 
computational approach. Computations, as a rule, are considered mainly from a symbol-processing 
point of view with as basic idea formal symbol manipulation by axiomatic rules, with a complete 
conceptual separation between the symbols and their physical embodiment. In this formal conception 
symbols and rules must be free of all influence other than their internal syntax, which means that there 
is no need to specify any specific sets of observables or to verify any truth-values with respect to the 
external world. Music, however, is also a sounding art, and to have meaning, its elements must be 
informally interpreted, measured, grounded or selected from the outside by a listener who functions as 
an external observer. Listeners, however, have a lot of freedom in delimiting the elements to which 
they can focus attention. As such they can apply symbolic labels to any possible delimitations of 
temporal unfoldings, which can be denoted in an act of mental pointing, and conceive of them as 
discrete things with “unit character”. The temporal unfoldings, however, can have a continuous 
representation as well, to the extent that they reflect the temporal articulation of the sound. 
The delimitation of elements, further, is not totally free, as there are ecological and psychological 
constraints, which narrow down the temporal window of the sounding elements that listeners may 
mentally point at. There is, e.g., a difference between high-frequency or high-resolution processing of 
the sound (in the range of about 10 milliseconds) and the processing in terms of perceptual units (in the 
range of 2–3 s), which allow event identification over time [74,75], allowing a transition from a 
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phenomenological description of the sound in acoustic terms to event perception and discrete labeling 
of temporal events. 
There is thus an element of sense-making or semiotization, that addresses two approaches: symbolic 
thinking and sensory experience. Both are related to the representational format, which is either 
discrete or continuous. Continuous or analog representation is time-consuming and proceeds in real 
time; discrete-symbolic representation is proceeding in a much more economic way, also called 
outside of time. It reduces temporal unfoldings to single representations with an all-or-none character, 
which lend themselves to symbolic computations, which can be carried out on them. Both approaches, 
further, are not opposed to each other, but are complementary, calling forth the possibility of a 
combined analog-discrete approach. It means that music can be represented in two ways, namely 
discrete (e.g., stave notation) and continuous (e.g., recorded audio), and that humans can process music 
either as symbolic thinking or as a sensory experience. The idea is not new, but using these dichotomies 
to shed light on each other is interesting. It challenges the common practice of much musicological 
research to study music as a structure that is conceived outside of time (e.g., the score) in favor of an 
approach that describes listening as a real time experience [68]. Dealing with music, then, is dependent 
upon the continuous sonorous unfolding which proceeds in linear time as well as on its symbolic and 
discrete counterparts, which can be handled in a kind of virtual simultaneity. Or stated in other terms: 
music can be considered a kind of distributed substrate with discontinuities and focal allocations of 
semantic weight [76].  
Music, in this view, is a time-consuming and sounding processual event that impinges upon our 
sensory and perceptual apparatus with its primary meaning being experiential [77] in relying heavily 
on the process of sentic modulation [78] which is a general modulatory system that is involved in 
conveying and perceiving the intensity of emotive expression by means of three graded spectra: tempo 
modulation (slow-fast), amplitude modulation (soft-loud) and register selection (low pitch-high pitch), 
somewhat analogous to the well-known rules of prosody. 
4. Dealing with Sound and Music: Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Claims 
Aural perception requires the processing of sound vibrations in ways that are both innate and 
acquired as the outcome of development over time. As such it calls forth ontogenetic claims, which are 
manifest most typically in the auditory development of the fetus and the neonate. The newborn, in this 
view, is not to be considered as a blank slate but as the product of a learning history, which started 
already in the womb. Besides this developmental history, however, there is also a lot of hard-wired 
reactive behavior, which is geared by some phylogenetically older functions of the brain. This is the 
case, e.g., for brain stem reflexes and subcortical processing (the level that is situated anatomically 
below the higher functions of the brain which are situated in the cortex of the brain) of the sounds.  
A typical example is the “startle reflex”, which is a defensive and fast emotional response to sudden or 
threatening stimuli, such as a sudden dissonant event. It is not just a brain stem reflex—as has long 
been thought—but a reflex-like reaction that can be qualified as a subcortical reflex [47]. Ample 
evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies has shown that subcortical structures, such as the 
parahippocampal gyrus and the amygdala, are involved in emotional responses to dissonance [79–82]. 
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It thus seems that there is a reflex-like response to dissonance, which may be innate, together with a 
preference for consonance, which is also not dependent on prenatal or early postnatal experience. 
Hearing newborns from deaf parents, e.g., prefer consonance to dissonance [65], which points into an 
innate mechanism without auditory learning history. It has been shown, moreover, that even musicians 
who consider dissonance to be highly pleasant, exhibit enhanced electrodermal activity in response to 
dissonant music as compared to the consonant versions of the same music [48]. The mechanism is 
probably linked with the primary function of the auditory system as an adaptive functionality for signal 
detection—to estimate the size of objects or to assess sound sources and their characteristics—and 
which may be helpful to survive in a threatening environment. 
4.1. Fetal Auditory Development 
Auditory capability is one of the earliest discriminative abilities of the fetus, which has been shown 
to react in an increasingly sophisticated way to sounding stimuli already in its intrauterine phase of 
development [83]. Its development shows consecutively an increased fetal heart rate response to loud 
sounds (18 weeks of gestation), initial inconsistent responses to sound (25 to 27 weeks), consistent 
responses to auditory stimuli (29 weeks), initial hearing of maternal sounds and responses to them, and 
a beginning of discrimination among speech sounds, particularly with regard to pitch and rhythms  
(30 to 35 weeks) [84]. The full-term infant, further, responds to auditory stimuli at birth with a 
consistent head turn, particularly to higher frequencies at a moderate decibel level [85]. Having 
processed much auditory information during prenatal development, the infant also recognizes the voice 
of its mother at birth, prefers the voices of women and recognizes stories and melodies that were heard 
during the final trimester of fetal growth, with a preference for its native language [86–88]. 
As such, the auditory system seems to rely on genetically pre-wired universal processing dispositions, 
which are shaped also to some extent also by the intrauterine learning history and the auditory 
exposure from birth, which is critical to the further development and specification of the auditory 
abilities [44]. There is, further, a dynamic tension between music-specific and general-acoustic 
processes of auditory discrimination, but it should be borne in mind that the auditory system was 
devised primarily as an instrument for the detection and localization of distant acoustical disturbances, 
and as a contributor to the identification of the disturbing events, mostly within an action-oriented 
behavior. Acute perception, therefore, seems to have an evolutionary advantage in providing better 
fitness for interactions with a given environment. The end result of this screening behavior, however, 
does not merely depend on the relationship between the physical properties of the stimulus and the 
efficiency of the activated auditory system, but is weighed by the listener as an organism through 
simultaneous evaluation of the stimulus as a releaser of purposive behavior [89] (p. 231). 
There is thus an aspect of signification in the process of dealing with sounds, which goes beyond a 
mere dispositional machinery for signal detection and psychophysical processing of the sounds and 
which stresses the role of the learning history that starts in the womb and which is related to the 
neurologic development of the fetus and the newborn infant. In the third trimester of fetal development, 
e.g., the human fetus adds 250,000 neurons per minute in the developing brain with the most critical 
period for the growth of human nervous cells (dendrites of the cerebral cortex) occurring between  
20 weeks gestations and two years of age. Each newborn infant, therefore, must self-construct his 
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cortical growth from post birth experiences, thus creating its own unique neurological connections and 
manifesting a lot of neural plasticity as well [44]. 
4.2. Neonates and Music-Related Sounds: Motherese and Infant-Directed Speech 
The neural plasticity, which is so typical for neonates, is reflected also in the way they cope with 
music. As a rule, they seem to respond to music in rather sophisticated ways, perceptually speaking,  
by exhibiting a selective orientation to musical sounds, along with a more fine-grained critical 
discrimination of particular musical sound features, both of which are enacted via sensorimotor  
(i.e., vocal and gestural) engagement with the music [90]. Caregivers all over the world have 
capitalized on this disposition by providing special kinds of music (lullabies and playsongs) and even 
special kinds of speech—called motherese, or parentese—with song-like qualities that seem to be very 
similar across all cultures. [91,92]. They talk to preverbal infants in a special way [93,94] and infants 
prefer to listen to this infant-directed speech to adult-directed speech [95–97]. This “baby talk”, which 
seems to be important for the cognitive development of the child by influencing cortical connections in 
the brain as the result of positive experience [98] seems to provide the right kind of environment 
during the first years of life. It tends to be higher in pitch, more rhythmic, and, most important for 
mediating infant preferences; it contains slower, more exaggerated pitch contours than adult-directed 
speech. Its common characteristics include extended vowels, mellifluous sound, narrow pitch range 
that rises for stimulation and falls for pacification, and repeated pitch contours [44,92,94,96,99–102]. 
In a sense, infant-directed speech could thus be called “musical speech”, because it differs from  
adult-directed speech in its prosodic or musical characteristics. 
Both infant-directed music and song-like speech, further, seem to be classified among the primary 
and preferred stimuli of the early sonic universe. They provide intentional environmental sounds, 
which can be distinguished from the ambient noise, and which have shown to have positive 
physiological and behavioral effects on premature infants and neonates. There are, moreover, also 
simple psychoacoustic considerations, which might explain the preference of infants for some of the 
acoustic parameters that specify this specific sonic universe. High-pitched voices, e.g., sound less 
rough because they have fewer harmonics that interact within critical bands on the basilar membrane 
of the inner ear [103]. 
Infants who possess prelinguistic perceptual skills are thus highly sensitive to music-related speech 
sounds and music by tuning-in to subtle shifts in vocal timbre, tempo, and volume variations. They are 
also able to negotiate and share a mutual communication with their caregivers by constantly adapting 
their tempo, intensity, motion, shape, and contour of their sounds, movements, and gestures [104].  
The newborn’s earliest interactions with their caregivers, for short, exhibit a distinctively musical 
character, which extends also to the expressive sound features of music. Young infants, in fact, are 
able to pick out not only holistic musical patterns but also fine-grained, formal properties of music, 
such as pitch, melody, tempo, and musical phrase structure, which all can be helpful in carrying 
expressivity and emotional content [105]. 
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5. From Sound to Meaning: Ecological and Biosemiotic Claims 
Dealing with sounds involves a process of sense-making that involves phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
claims. The latter, however, are dependent upon a learning history, which is highly idiosyncratic, as 
individual listener must face different sonic environments at different moments in their life. Yet, even 
this particular behavior exhibits some genetically-determined characteristics, which bring some benefit 
to them and which can be explained best in ethological terms. Ethology, which can be defined as the 
biological study of stereotypical behavior, is characterized by description of observable phenomena, 
with the aim to reduce the enormous variety of animal behavioral repertoires to simple explanatory 
mechanisms, which have been coined by Huxley the major problems of biology, namely causation, 
survival value and evolution, and to which Tinbergen has added also the problem of ontogeny [106]. 
Most of the ethological explanations of today are expressed in evolutionary terms, focusing on 
behaviors that are exhibited in quite analogous ways in the same or similar circumstances [107].  
Being species-specific or common to a variety of species, they mainly contribute to the survival or 
fitness of the species and revolve around how animals cope with their environment. As such, they 
should be described in observational terms in order to answer the vague and general ethological 
question: why do animals—and thus also listeners, as human animals—behave the way they do?  
There is need, therefore, of a preliminary descriptive stage that returns to observation and description in 
order to analyze or interpret the overwhelming variety of puzzling behavior patterns. Ethology thus has 
provided data, methods, and theories that can help in understanding how humans cope with their 
environment. It is a research program that is pretty much analogous to the contributions from ecology and 
biosemiotics. The translation to the realm of music, however, mostly still has to be done [77,108,109]. 
5.1. Organism and Environment: The Ecological Approach 
Starting from Haeckel’s definition of ecology as the science of the relations between an organism 
and its environmental outer word, and Kull’s related term of ecosemiotics—as the study of the 
semiotic interrelations between organisms and their environment [110–112]—it is possible to conceive 
of the process of dealing with music in ecological terms as “coping with the sounds”. This means that 
the way that listeners make sense of music is determined both by the characteristics of the listener as 
an organism and the music as environment. There is, however, not yet a major tradition of thinking of 
music in ecological terms [77,109,113,114] as most studies in ecological perception have been 
concerned with visual rather than with auditory stimuli.  
The ecological program was mapped out by Gibson [32,33] who claimed that perceivers search out 
actively information, which becomes obtained information by leaning on perceptual systems rather 
than on senses. Senses, in this view, do not simply function to arouse sensations but pick up information, 
which is already structured and ordered as part of an organism-environment ecosystem [32] (p. 47).  
As such they should be conceived as perceptual systems, which are tuned to the information that is 
considered to be useful, stressing the reciprocity of the organism and its environment, hence, the role 
of key concepts, such as attunement, reciprocity and resonance, and the corresponding perceptual 
processes of detection, discrimination, recognition and identification. They all stress the role of direct 
perception [32,33,115], which claims that perception is a form of noninferential awareness without the 
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mind intervening actively in the process. It involves direct contact with the sensory stimuli with 
reactions that are elicited in a lock-and-key approach, by applying conceptual knowledge that has been 
assimilated in the cognitive structure of the listener as the outcome of previous interactions with the 
sounds. As such, it calls forth the principles of reality and of cognitive economy, which means that 
there really is something “out there”—this is the “empiricist” or “realist” claim of perception—ready 
to be picked up an to be processed in a much more economical way. It has the advantage of speed of 
processing, which, in turn, has adaptive values for surviving in case of threatening situations. 
The same holds true for dealing with music. Making sense out of the perceptual flux is not reducible 
to a kind of naive realism with acoustical or auditory listening as the only processing mechanism [116]. 
What matters is not merely an acoustical description of the continuous flow of matter in the physical 
world, but the way how human listeners structure this flow, and this is the basic tension between the 
“bottom-up” and “top-down” approach with the mind applying discrete labels (top-down) to a 
continuous unfolding (bottom-up). What listeners are listening to, therefore, are not sounding things, 
but “things as signs”, which shape their world. 
5.2. Affordances and the Functional Approach 
Conceiving of sounding stimuli as signs involves the introduction of the listener as an active 
searcher for meaning. It stresses the role of interaction between an organism and its environment, or in 
musical terms, the role of the sensorimotor engagement of the listener and its surrounding sonic universe. 
The critical element in this approach is the sensitivity to functional characteristics of the environment. 
Animals and organisms, in general, perceive objects in their environment in terms of what they 
“afford” for the consummation of behavior, rather than in terms of their objective and perceptual 
qualities. The same claim was furthered by Gibson in his ecological psychology, as evidenced in the 
concept of affordance, which refers to environmental supports for an organism’s intentional activities: 
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either 
for good or ill.” [33] (p. 127); [117]. 
Affordances, in this view, are subjective qualities that render them apt for specific activities, such as 
supporting locomotion, concealment, manipulation, nutrition and social interaction for the animal [33]. 
Numerous examples can be given, such as the surface of water as support for water striders or storks 
that nest on top of chimneys. As such, they are, first of all, environmental supports for goal-directed 
action, which are specified in relation to the activity-repertoire and skills that are unique to different 
animals. Animals’ sensitivities to different affordances, therefore, are both a function of their biology 
and their developmental and experiential history, which means that only an animal with a certain kind 
of anatomy and capacity for movement can see, e.g., a doorknob as graspable and pullable. Animals 
lacking this anatomy and motor capacity will not perceive these particular affordances [45]. 
Affordances, however, are not merely subjective. Being real and objective, they provide a conceptual 
tool that goes beyond the objective/subjective dichotomy by claiming that there is no outside standing 
over against an inside, but only ways to classify experiences [118]. As Gibson puts it:  
“… an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property: or it is both if 
you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to 
understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior.  
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It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer.” [33] (p. 129). 
The concept of affordance, as coined by Gibson, is the ecological equivalent of meaning, 
elaborating the idea that the meaning of a thing has a physiognomic character, as stressed already by 
Gestalt psychology. Koffka called this the “demand character” of things: “Each thing says what it is ... 
a fruit says ‘Eat me’; water says ‘Drink me’; thunder says ‘Fear me’; and woman says ‘Love me’.” [119]. 
Lewin, who was considered as the founder of ecological psychology, used the related term “invitation 
character” (Aufforderungscharakter) or “valence” [120] to express the meaning of things and von 
Uexküll [37,112,121–123] argued in a similar way in his early biosemiotic claims by introducing the 
concepts of “counter-ability” (Gegenleistung), “functional tone” and “functional cycle” to illustrate the 
importance of functional and semantic relations that biological organisms establish with their 
environment. In the counter-ability lies the meaning of an object for the existence of an organism.  
It has been elaborated more in depth in the concept of functional tone, which can be easily grasped 
through the example of a tree that has a number of different qualities or tones, dependent on the 
intentions that an animal or human being may confer on it. It can be a shelter for a fox, a support for 
the oil, a thoroughfare for the squirrel, hunting-providing grounds for the ant, egg-laying facilities for 
the beetle and a source of valuable raw material for the forester [37]. As such there is no one-to-one 
relationship between an object in the outer world and its actual meaning. Each organism, on the 
contrary, perceives the world through a network of functional relations, thus constituting its own 
phenomenal world or Umwelt, which, in turn, can be considered as the sum total of its perceptual cues 
among the stimuli in its environment. It is constituted of functional cycles, which operate by means of 
trigger mechanisms that select a number of objects with a special relevance to act as either perceptual 
or functional cue bearers. Both are related to each other in the sense that the functional qualities affect 
the perceptual ones—hence the concept of cycle—by transforming the object of perception by giving it 
a functional tone. Our relation to the world, therefore, is not merely representational, but is functional 
as well, which means that the number of objects, which an animal can distinguish in its own world 
equals the number of functions it can carry out [37] (p. 49). The objects, which an organism or animal 
confronts, therefore, are not neutral objects, but objects that are transformed into meaning-carriers as 
soon as they enter into a relationship with a subject. This is illustrated by von Uexküll’s example of an 
angry dog that barks at somebody on a country road. In order to drive the dog away, the person can 
pick up a stone, which first lies on the ground, to throw it at the dog. By doing this, he transforms its 
meaning and quality from a mere support for the walker’s feet (path-quality) to that of becoming a 
missile, thus assigning a different functional tone to it (throw-quality) [122] (p. 27). 
5.3. Musical Affordances 
Dealing with music in ecological and biosemiotic terms means that we should try to understand 
music not merely in terms of its acoustical qualities but in terms of what it affords to the listener [123–128]. 
Listeners, in fact, build up relations with the sonic world, selecting some of them to give them special 
meanings. As such, there is a whole history of ontogenetic development that contributes to the 
construction of a sonic Umwelt, which can be considered as a collection of subjective meanings that 
are assigned to some elements of a specific subset of the sounding environment. Music, in this view, 
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should be described in terms of its functional signification and affordances. The question, however, is 
what such musical affordances are? Starting from the ecological concept of interaction with the 
environment, there seem at least to be three major possibilities: (i) the production of musical 
instruments out of sounding material; (ii) the use of playing techniques in order to produce musical 
sounds; and (iii) the shaping of the sound by using modulatory techniques [125]. 
Examples of the first are exemplified in the history of musical instrument building. About all kinds 
of materials have been scrutinized for what they afford to human ears from a musical point of view.  
This holds true for traditional instruments as well as for the many attempts at finding new sounds out 
of new materials. But also the development of playing techniques is related to the search for sounding 
materials, with a special focus on the sound-producing or sound-related actions that can be applied to 
them [129–131]. Sound-producing actions include “excitatory actions”, such as hitting, stroking, 
scrapping, bowing, kicking and blowing—all of them being actions that consist of transferring energy 
from the body to resonating objects, such as strings, plates, tubes and membranes—as well as 
“modulatory actions” that modify the sound, such as vibrato, opening and closing a brass mute or 
placing a string mute on the bridge [129]. The shaping of the sound, finally, is a further extension of 
sound production. Strings, e.g., can be plucked or bowed, but within the action category of bowing, 
there is a whole spectrum of techniques for modulation of the sound. The same holds true for singers 
who use their singing technique to shape the sounds that result from the air supply provided by the 
lungs. Singing involves not merely the production of vowels and consonants, but involves aspects of 
intonation and common ways of emotional expression, such as timing, articulation, dynamics, tone 
onsets and vibrato. It embraces, for short, the whole gamut of sentic modulation [78] with the three 
graded spectra of tempo modulation, amplitude modulation and selection of register. 
All these examples, further, refer to the productive aspects of musical affordances, which take as a 
starting point the raw material and what it affords for musical sound production.  
It is possible, however, to conceive of affordances also at the receptive level of experience and to 
conceive of them in terms of perceptual, mood induction and socio-communicative qualities, which 
invoke aspects of sense-making, emotional experience, aesthetic experience, entrainment and 
judgments of value [45,127,132]. To quote Krueger: “Music, in this view, is mainly perceived as an 
affordance-laden structure and the musical experience is fundamentally a temporally extended, 
exploratory activity...” [45] (p. 2). Picking up musical affordances, in this view, is what it means to 
speak of music as being experienced as “something that we can do things with”, to coin his term, but it 
is only experienced as such by listeners with the appropriate perceptual and affective sensitivities. 
It is possible, finally, to bring together productive and experiential aspects of musical affordances as 
exemplified in the huge body of action and perception studies [36]. Music, in this view, is something 
that induces a kind of motor resonance that prompts the listeners to experience the sounds as if they are 
involved in their production [133]. It is a claim, which is somewhat analogous to the central version of 
the motor theory of perception, which means that “motor intention” rather than “manifest motor 
behavior” is thought to be a largely endogenous phenomenon, which is localized in the central nervous 
system. It has been shown, in fact, that there is a motor aspect in perception and that the same areas in 
the brain are activated during imagined and executed actions (the supplementary motor area) and the 
same holds true for imagined action as well [134–138]. Perception, therefore, can be considered as 
simulated action, as imagining the actions that are implied in manipulating the perceived objects. 
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Not all perception, however, is reducible to motor components, but motor components are involved 
in perception and are an integral part of it [36,139]. Even if they are not manifest, they operate at 
virtual levels of imagery and simulation—also called ideomotor simulation—with motor behavior 
being manifest only at an ideational level of mental representation. What is argued for, therefore, is a 
kind of phenomenal experience, which involves the experience of movement but without the action 
being actual or manifest. It corresponds to the so-called internal imagery—or first person 
perspective—which enables the transition from overt action to internalized forms of action. The whole 
process calls forth a kind of motor empathy and ideomotor simulation, allowing the listener to experience 
the music as something that moves over time, while simultaneously experiencing this movement as a 
movement of the own body [133]. Musical affordances, therefore, involve an aspect of egocentricity, in 
describing subjective experiences in terms of bodily resonance or motor imagery that projects the 
listener’s bodily movements to the music. 
A last interpretation of music in terms of affordances, finally, is more manifest and involves  
musical entrainment and the possibility to move in reaction to the sounding music. Music, then, is a 
stimulus for movement and is perceived in terms of its motor induction capacities. The movements can 
be specific and articulate, but they can relate also to more general levels of motor induction, as forces 
and energies that are inherent in musical structures. 
6. Conclusions and Perspectives 
The major aim of this contribution was to describe music as a sounding environment. Starting from 
an ethological approach to dealing with music, it has revolved around the ecological concept of 
organism/environment interaction, conceiving of the listener as an organism and the music as 
environment. Music, in this view, is considered as a subuniverse of the more-encompassing  
sonic universe with the sounding environment—as part of the sonic universe—being described not 
merely in objective, but also in subjective terms. As such, there is a lot of subjectivity in the 
delimitation of the sounding world as it appears to individual listeners, which then becomes a 
subjective or phenomenal world. But even if they seem to be very idiosyncratic, the phenomenal 
worlds are grounded also in some relatively unchanging biological processes of aural perception, 
which are universal across human listeners. 
Music, thus, is constituted of a set of elements that may be selected and delimited at will. This can 
be done by acts of focal attention and conscious efforts but there is also a lot of subconscious 
processing and reactive behavior to the sounds. To the extent, further, that these basic constituents are 
considered as discrete units, it is possible to conceive of music as a Humboldt system with discrete 
elements that lean themselves to mental computations. This calls forth a computational approach to 
music with elements that refer basically to themselves, allowing a description of music in terms of 
internal semantics. Music, however, is also a sounding art, with aspects of meaning, which cannot be 
grasped merely in symbolic terms. As such, it calls forth an experiential description as well, as 
evidenced in the earliest ways of coping with the sounds. This is exemplified most typically by studies 
on fetal auditory development and auditory abilities of neonates, which are illustrative of the innate 
dispositions for coping with the sounds and the developmental plasticity that refers to the ontogenetic 
development of individual music listeners. 
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Listening, then, is a process of reactive behavior that is grounded in phylogenetically older levels of 
processing as well as higher level functioning of the brain. As such, there is a possible transition from 
mere sensory processing to sense-making as the outcome of a learning history, and this latter can be 
described in ecological and biosemiotic terms, by stressing the role of interactions with the sounds and 
by assigning functional meaning to these interactions. This is exemplified convincingly in the 
ecological and biosemiotic concepts of affordance and functional tone, which provide conceptual and 
operational means for the description of processes of sense-making that are the outcome of the 
establishment of functional relations between listener and environment. 
It is possible, finally, to suggest future directions and perspectives based on the lines of thinking 
presented in this paper and to present a whole research program for empirical research. Some of them 
have started already, other ones are still waiting for implementation at a larger scale. There are at least 
four possible domains: (i) assessment studies, which should aim at collecting data about what listeners 
actually attend to while listening in a real time listening situation; (ii) methodological studies to 
provide the appropriate measurement tools for continuous recordings of acts of focal and distributed  
sense-making; (iii) setting up of a whole research program for exploring the possibilities of musical 
affordances, both at the productive and receptive level, somewhat analogous to the research program 
that was launched in the early action and perception studies [140–144]; and (iv) studies on the 
possibility of music as a sonic environment to influence social behavior. There have been some 
interesting experiments with music at the urban scales, e.g., by broadcasting classical music in 
shopping mails, parks and other public places to deter certain types of loiterers. The ethics of this, 
however, might be questioned. 
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